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Comments
THE WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS-KENTUCKY'S ANSWER TO THE
EXPANDING FEDERAL CONCEPT OF PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS IN CRIMINAL CASES
In recent years there has been an increasing number of applications to the
federal courts by prisoners seeking release on petitions of habeas corpus.' Many
of these petitions have come from prisoners after affirmance of their convictions
by the highest courts of the states. A number of these petitions have been granted
and prisoners released. This would seem to indicate that the state courts have
failed or refused to provide the type of protection which the Supreme Court of
the United States has held must be provided in order to conform to the due process
clause of the Federal Constitution. This is borne out by the fact that many of
these cases have scrutinized and criticized the various processes and procedures of
the state courts.- This broadening by the Supreme Court of the concept of due
process on the criminal side of the law has put pressure on the state courts and
legislatures to liberalize existing remedies, and provide new procedures and safe-
guards to citizens being tried on a criminal charge. The reluctance by the states
to effect these changes has thrown a mass of habeas corpus litigation into the lower
federal courts' which should properly be handled by the state courts.
The subjective test of fairness and justice which the Supreme Court has
adopted in interpreting the due process clause has not only opened up a fertile
field in constitutional law, but has had a marked effect upon the criminal law.
Primarily, this effect has manifested itself in the increased resort to the federal
courts with crudely drawn habeas corpus petitions by prisoners, 4 and in the actions
of the various states, either by the legislature, or by judicial decision, in hastily
attempting to plug holes in the wall of their criminal procedure, as fast as a gap
has been exposed by an allowance of habeas corpus in the Federal Court.i
'Holtzoff, Collateral Review of Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U.L. REV.
26 (1945); Note, The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas
Corpus, 61 HARv. L. REv. 657 (1948).
"Young v. Ragen, 837 U.S. 235, 69 Sup. Ct. 1073, 93 L. Ed. 1338 (1949);
Marino v. Ragen, 382 U.S. 561, 68 Sup. Ct. 240, 92 L. Ed. 170 (1947).
See note 1 supra.
'Pyle v. Kansas, 817 U.S. 213, 63 Sup. Ct. 177, 87 L. Ed. 214 (1942).
'Oklahoma provides for trial of due process issues under its general habeas
corpus statute, stating simply that habeas corpus may be brought to relieve from
detentions in violation of due process of law. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, see. 1331
(1941). Califorma has found it expeditious to expand habeas corpus. Ex parte
McGomgle, Cal. 188 P. 2d 7 (1948). Illinois procedure provides for either habeas
corpus or writ of error coram nobis or, if the facts do not fall into one, then both.
Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173, 67 Sup. Ct. 216, 91 L. Ed. 172 (1946); Woods
v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 66 Sup. Ct. 996, 90 L. Ed. 1177 (1943). However,
in Marmno v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 68 Sup. Ct. 240, 92 L. Ed. 170 (1947) the
situation in Illinois is considered deplorably confusing both to the Supreme Court
and the person seeking relief. The selection of one of the remedies is almost sure
to lead to advice to try the other. Comment, Collateral Relief from Convictions in
Violation of Due Process in Illinois, 42 ILL. L. Rxv. 329 (1947); Florida utilizes
the writ of error coram nobis which has been approved by the Supreme Court.
Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 62 Sup. Ct. 688, 86 L. Ed. 932 (1942). Alabama
has adopted the same procedure for trying due process issues. Taylor v. Alabama,
335 U.S. 252, 68 Sup. Ct. 1415, 92 L. Ed. 1144 (1948).
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Kentucky is one of those states that has felt the effect of the "freedom writ"
cases in the Supreme Court on its procedure. The pattern of the Kentucky cases
is illustrative of the problem faced in most of the states. An unusual case will
arse which looks harsh to almost everyone, even to the court, but applying the
law as it exists in cases and statutes no relief can be given. After habeas corpus
to the federal court the prisoner is released, with an opinion which states that the
prisoner was deprived of his constitutional guaranty of due process of law. The
next time this problem arises some precedent is overturned and that particular
hole in the wall is plugged. The change has been effected as the defects have
been exposed.8
The ancient writ of coram nobis has been found by many states to be pecul-
iarly adaptable to filling these gaps. The writ is flexible enough to cover due
process questions. Kentucky has resurrected it and the writ seems to fit the
urgent need.
At the common law the writ of error corarn nobzs was used in both civil and
criminal actions. Its purpose was to correct errors of fact not appearing on the
record, and not attributable to petitioner s negligence, which if known would have
prevented the entry of judgment;- as opposed to the ordinary writ of error which
was used to correct errors of law.' The former was addressed to the judge of the
court wherein the judgment was entered and revested that court with jurisdiction
to reopen the case in its discretion; the latter was addressed to the appellate court
for a review of the errors of law appearing on the record for affirmance or reversal.
The writ of error lay as a matter of right and was a continuation of the proceedings
below and only errors assigned could be reviewed.9 The writ of error coram nobzs,
unlike the writ of error, was a new action civil in nature." The petition cast no
aspersions on the trial court's judgment because it went only to matters dehors
the record which were unknown to the trial judge and hence not 'passed upon."
The expanding concept of due process in the Federal Courts has resulted in
the situation in many code states, of which Kentucky is one, where no procedural
remedy is available to have an issue litigated in certain unusual criminal cases
involving hardship." The Kentucky Court, sensitive of its procedural deficiencies,
has utilized this ancient writ to augment the Code remedies and to fill in this due
process gap. Although this is a remedy in its comparative infancy in this state,
it promises to offer new possibilities as the concept of procedural due process
crystalizes.
aSee Anderson v. Buchanan, 292 Ky. 810, 168 S.W 2d 48 (1943) for a his-
tory of coram nobzs cases in Kentucky and the experiences of other states with the
same problem.
ISanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. Rep. 29 (1882), 31 AM. Junt., 323,
325, 24 C. J. S. 145.
8 Am. JuR. 766.
93 AM. Jm. 152, 155.
'
0 A proceeding on statutory petition in nature of writ of error coram nobis is
civil in nature and the state is entitled to an appeal. People v. Fiegen, 291 IMl.
App. 615, 10 N.E. 2d 684 ( ........ ); State ex rel. Meyer v. Youngblood, 221 Ind.
408, 48 N.E. 2d 55 (1948). Since coram nobis is civil in nature the prisoner need
not be present at the hearing. Elliot v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 614, 167 S.W 2d
703 (1942).
11 1 Am. Jun. 323; Comment, 2 ARK. L. REv. at page 427 (1947-48); Note,
37 HAnv. L. Rnv. 744 (1923-24).
'Nickels v. State, 86 Fla. 208, 98 So. 502 (1923) (Plea of guilty entered
under fear of bodily harm); State v. Ray, Il Kan. 350, 207 Pac. 192 (1922)
(Confession obtained by duress).
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Though there is some evidence of its use in pre-Code practice," the writ of
coram nob~s was never sought in Kentucky after adoption of the Code until the
year 1937. it being commonly understood that the remedies of the Code were
exclusive. Apparently, the provisions for appeal and the writ of habeas corpus
had provided an adequate procedural remedy in criminal cases until this time.
In the case of Jones v. Commonwealth4 a deplorable defect in the criminal
remedial processes in this state was exposed. Jones was convicted and sentenced
to death for murder. After affirmance of his conviction on appeal's and after
expiration of the term in which the judgment was rendered, which under the
applicable Criminal Code provisions precluded motion for a new trial,"6 the two
chief prosecuting witnesses admitted they had given false and perjured testimony
in the trial which led to his conviction. Jones petitioned the trial court for a writ
of habeas corpus on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The writ was
denied and on appeal the Court refused to expand habeas corpus further than to
cover a defect in jurisdiction which would render the judgment voidY However,
the Court indicated in the opimon that coram nobis might lie. Subsequently, Jones
petitioned the trial court for a writ of error coram nobts. The writ was denied.
On appeaP the Court acknowledged that the writ was not entirely superseded by
the Code and that it might be available in a "proner case." On the merits of the
case the writ was denied, however, as the Court held that coram nobts would not
lie to reopen a judgment after a conviction had been affirmed by the appellate
court." In the opinion the Court also stated that Kentucky Civil Code provisions'
pertaining to motion and grounds for a new trial in a civil case after expiration of
the term for newly discovered evidence did not apply to criminal cases.' In re-
fusing to allow coram nobis to lie for newly discovered evidence the Court indi-
cated that it was the intent of the framers of the Criminal Code that the provisions
provided therein were to be exclusive and the only remedy available to a defen-
dant in such a predicament was an appeal to the governor for executive clemency.
The opinion expressed sympathy for Jones, but indicated that no process to have
the case reopened was available to him under Kentucky criminal procedure. Jones
stood to be sacrificed on "the altar of legal formalism."
The end was not yet, however, for Jones. He petitioned the Federal District
Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The questions were certified to the Circuit
Court of Appeals and the writ was allowed." The crux of the decision was that
the failure of the State of Kentucky to provide a remedial process whereby the
prisoner could raise the issue of perjured evidence after expiration of the term was
denial of due process within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. Further-
"3 Meredith v. Sanders, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb.) 101 (1810).
" 269 Ky. 772, 108 S.W 2d 812 (1937).
" Jones v. Commonwealth, 267 Ky. 465 102 S.W 2d 345 (1936).
" Ky. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. sec. 273 (1948).
' Tageman v. Kirkpatrick, 288 Ky 798, 143 S.W 2d 506 (1940).
s See note 14 supra.
"It seems that the general basis for refusing to allow criminal cases to be
reopened after affirmance on appeal was the resulting instability which such prac-
tice would have on conviction of crime in the state. See, Bigharn v. Brewer, 4
Sneed 432 (Tenn. 1856); Humphreys v. State, 129 Wash. 309, 224 Pac. 937, 33
A. L. R. 78 (1924).
Ky. CODE, Civ. PROC. ANN. see. 340 (7), 344, 518.
"Coldiron v. Commonwealth, 205 Ky 729, 266 S.W 374 (1924); Welling-
ton v. Commonwealth, 159 Ky. 462, 167 S.W 427 (1914).
-Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F 2d 335 (C.C.A. 6th 1938).
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more, the Court held that leaving a condemned man to his chances of obtaining
an executive pardon was not a satisfaction of the requirement of due process of
law. The Circuit Court was no doubt influenced by the opimon filed in the case
on the behalf of the Attorney General of Kentucky which confessed that it would
be an injustice to execute the man under the circumstances.
The Jones case exposed a gap in the Kentucky criminal procedure which the
Federal Courts had indicated could not be satisfied by the dubious remedy of
executive pardon. Hence, some element of Kentucky procedure had to be ex-
panded or a new procedure adopted to supplement the existing remedial pro-
cesses.
It is not surrising then that in Smith v. Buchanan,' where it was subse-
quently discovered that counsel appointed to defend Smith was not a member of
the bar, the Kentucky Court by dictum indicated that the writ of coram nobts was
the proper remedy and expressed disapproval of prior decisions' to the effect that
coram nobis would not lie affer aflfirmance on appeal. Habeas corpus would not
reach the error complained of because the defect was not apparent in the record
and was unknown to the trial court at the time judgment was rendered. There
was dictum in the case, adhering to the rule enunciated in previous cases indicat-
ing that coram nobis would still not lie for newly discovered evidence. This seems
to be the majority rule in those jurisdictions which have considered the question. '
The strict logic for allowing coram nobzs after aflrmance on appeal is prob-
ably best expressed in the Indiana case of Stephenson v. State.' This case con-
tains a discussion of the distinctions between the common law appeal, the common
law writ of error, and the writ of error coram nobts. The common law appeal
provided for a re-examination of both law and fact by the appellate- court and
a decision by that court as if no decree had been rendered. The judgment if
affirmed became the judgment of the appellate court. The writ of error provided
for an examination of alleged errors of law committed by the trial court and the
case was not open to a re-examination on the merits. An affirmance on appeal
meant only that no error of law was found in the trial of the case in the inferior
court. No error appearing, the judgment of the trial court stood as a judgment
of the case. In other words the finality of the judgment lay in the trial court,
since the review by writ of error indicated only that there had been no errors of
law committed in the handling of the case m the trial court. Therefore, since the
trial court had jurisdiction over its own judgments, it might properly reopen a
case even after affirmance on appeal to consider new matters of fact not previously
passed upon. The writ of error Coram nobis goes to errors of fact not appearing
on the record and unknown to the court at the time of the trial. Since affirmance
on appeal by way of writ of error examined only the questions of law decided by
the trial court, and was not an examination of the facts, there is no logical reason
why the trial court could not reopen the case on a writ of coram nobis after af-
firmance on appeal. In the Stephenson case the Court decided that the code of
Indiana had not adopted the common law appeal method of review, and hence
there was no valid reason why the writ of corain nobis could not lie after afirm-
ance on appeal. '
- 291 Ky. 44, 163 S.W 2d 5, 145 A.L.R. 813 (1942).2' Robertson v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky. 762, 132 S.W 2d 69 (1939); Jones
v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 779, 108 S.W 2d 816 (1937).See Anno. 33 A.L.R. 84; Note, 31 Ky L. J. 86 (1942).
205 Ind. 194, 186 N.E. 293, 145 A.L.R. 813 (1933).
-' The rule set out in the Stephenson case is now the majority rule and all the
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Although the Stephenson case was not cited in Smith v. Buchanan it might
well be argued that the reasoning employed therein could be used to justify the
use of coram nobzs after affirmance on appeal in Kentucky The Kentucky Civil
Code provides that the method of review in this state shall be an appeal.' The
Kentucky Criminal Code provides that only errors of law committed in the trial
court which are included in the motion and grounds for a new trial and assigned
as error in the bill of exceptions will be reviewed on appeal.' A reasonable in-
terpretation of both sections would seem to be that the method of review adopted
by the Code was the common law writ of error. If this assumption is sound there
is no valid reason why the writ of error coram nobis should not lie after affirmance
on appeal in Kentucky. This method of rationalizing also allows the writ of coram
nobts to be adopted into our procedural structure without doing violence to the
existing procedural remedies as defined in the Code and case law.
Further evolution of coram nobis brings us to the case of Sharpe v. Common-
wealth.' This case presented a procedural pattern that eventually forced the Ken-
tucky Court of Anpeals to face directly the problem of providing a remedial
process in cases involving newly discovered evidence. Sharpe was convicted of
murder and sentenced to the penitentiary. Sharpe then petitioned the trial court
to reopen the case on a writ of coram nobis, alleging that newly discovered evi-
dence had been obtained. The writ was denied and on appeal the Court reiterated
its former position that the writ would not lie for newly discovered evidence.'
Sharpe then petitioned the Federal District Court for a writ of habeas corpus.'
Relief was denied on the ground that he had not exhausted all available remedial
processes (habeas corpus) under Kentucky procedure. Dunng the interim Sharpe
unsuccessfully petitioned the Kentucky Court of Appeals for a writ of habeas cor-
pus. In denying the petition the Court stated:
"This court has consistently held the Civil Code provisions
for obtaining new trials are not applicable in criminal cases and that
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence cannot be
granted in criminal cases after the expiration of the term at which
judgment was rendered. We have also consistently held that no
such relief may be had by petition for writ of error coram nobts.
" if it-be finally determined by the Federal Courts
that due process of law demands that judicial process be available to
one seeking relief on this ground, it seems advisable that judicial pro-
cess other than habeas corpus be made available.
"While it may be necessary and proper for the Federal
Courts to extend the scope of habeas corpus in order to give full effect
to the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution, and this seems to be the tendency, we deem it advisable to
confine the scope of such proceedings within rather narrow limits."-
(Italics writer s)
cases holding to the contrary in the United States, except in North Carolina, have
been overruled. See 145 A.L.R. at 820.
Ky. CODE, CIv. PROC. ANN. see. 515.
'Ky. CODE, CuM. PROc. ANN. sees. 282, 840.
'284 Ky. 88, 148 S.W 2d 857 (1940).
st Ibid.
Ex Parte Sharpe, 86 F Supp. 886 (W D. Ky. 1941), aff. Sharpe v. Buch-
anan, 121 F 2d 448.
Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 86, 88, 165 S.W 2d 998, 994 (1942).
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A summation of Sharpe s position thus showed that the Civil Code provisions
for obtaining a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence did not apply
to criminal cases. Such relief could not be obtained through the writ of coram
nobts, and the Court refused to extend habeas corpus to meet the exigencies of
the situation. Therefore, the only avenue left open to Sharpe under Kentucky
procedure was an appeal for executive clemency.
While the habeas corpus appeal before the Kentucky Court of Appeals was
pending, Sharpe filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United
States appealing from the denial of habeas corpus by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
After the decision of the Kentucky Court denying habeas corpus certiorari was
granted and the Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court of Appeals remanding
the case.3 Since the Circuit Court of Appeals had denied Sharpe s application for
a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that he had not exhausted all the remedial
processes of the state, this obstacle was removed with the decision of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals on the application there for a writ of habeas corpus. Sharpe s
later application to the District Court was denied on the merits.'
With this reversal by the Supreme Court, the Kentucky Court was squarely
faced with the problem of either providing additional remedial processes for cases
involving such a problem as presented in Sharpe v. Commonwealth or leaving
defendants the resort of seeking relief from the Federal Courts.'
The language of the Sharpe case in denying habeas corpus is indicative of
the realization by the Kentucky Court, that if due process demanded additional
remedial process to augment existing Kentucky procedure, that Kentucky would
conform and that coram nobis would be the remedy.
The question next arose in the case of Anderson v. Buchanan.' Petitioner
sought a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that his conviction had
been obtained by the use of false and perjured evidence and coram nobis was
allowed. The Court's well considered opinion thoroughly reviewed all prior
coram nobts cases. The problem of newly discovered evidence after affirmance
on appeal was presented squarely, and the effect of the case was the overruling of
precedent which had held that there was no remedy to one seeking a new trial
on that basis in criminal cases.
The Court admitted that it was much impressed by the tendency of the Su-
preme Court to entertain crudely drawn petitions by prisoners on application for
habeas corpus. In the course of the opinion, in which two judges dissented, the
majority believed that the "arm of justice ought not to be any weaker or any shorter
than it is in the Federal Courts." [Italics writers]
The dissent in the Anderson case labeled coram nobis the "wild ass" of the
law, and that the confusion of prior decisions had set the criminal law of Kentucky
asail without a mast on the dangerous sea of indefiniteness. But weighting the
' Sharpe v. Buchanan, 817 U.S. 238, 63 Sup. Ct. 245, 87 L. Ed. 338 (1942).
Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 142 F 2d 213 (C.C.A. Ky. 1944), cert. denied, 64
Sup. Ct. 67, 320 U.S. 767, 88 L. Ed. 458 (1944).
8 Other states have found themselves in a similar predicament because of out-
moded procedural processes which failed to conform to the federal requirement
of due process. These states have employed coram nobts to meet that demand.
See cases cited note 5 supra, note, 39 MicH. L. REv. 963 (1941).
'292 Ky. 810, 168 S.W 2d 48 (1943).
s In Hysler v. Florida, note 5 supra, the Supreme Court stated that the writ
of coram nobts, which had only recently been adopted into the Florida procedure
was sufficient to meet the due process requirements of the Federal Constitution.
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exigencies of the need on the one side, coupled with the strong decisions of the
Federal Courts, the majority believed that it was still within the power of the
courts to sufficiently harness and control this antiquated judicial demon, and to
protect themselves against undue imposition by this newly found remedy.
The urgency of the need in cases involving a death sentence demonstrates
the necessity of leaving open a procedural door to allow the issue of newly dis-
covered evidence to be litigated, when the evidence be of such conclusive nature
as to satisfy the court that the judgment was wrong, and the trial as conducted
was tantamount to no trial at all. Opposed to this admittedly urgent need is the
problem of removing the stability of judgments in criminal cases. The latter fear
had heretofore been the haunting specter which seemed to overcome the Court
when the question was raised.'
This is not to give the reader the imnression that the writ of coram nobis is a
panacea; that it is a substitute for appeal, or an alternate remedy to habeas corpus.
It was born in Kentucky law in an atmosphere of urgency- it will continue to sur-
vive only within the confines of extreme need. 0
The purpose of coram nobzs is to supplement the existing criminal procedure
in Kentucky and not to supplant it. The exact scope of the remedy as it exists
in Kentucky law may best be illustrated by a quote from the Anderson case:
"[the real purpose of the writ is] to revest the court with
jurisdiction in an extreme emergency and permit inquiry into the im-
portant question of whether the judgment of conviction should be
vacated because the defendant was unknowingly deprived of a defense
which would have probably disproved his guilt and prevented his
conviction, and if that probability be established to grant the defen-
dant a new trial of the accusation." t (Italics writer s)
As coram nobis stands in Kentucky law, questions of Federal due process,
and Kentucky "due course" may be brought to the attention of the court through
its office. The writ "possesses germs of growth and flexibility sufficient to make
it a valuable remedy in raising due process questions."4 ' Caution, however, should
be employed even in raising a due process issue. The scope of the writ is rela-
tively narrow- it must be an error of fact; errors of law are to be properly litigated
by appeal, or by habeas corpus. The fact must have been unknown to the trial
court and not due to any lack of diligence on the part of the defendant, and not
appearing on the record. In other words in an ordinary case the remedy of appeal
and habeas corpus would suffice.
It is primarily in extraordinary situations that its utility will be appreciated,
but in a proper case, the urgency of the need will demonstrate its usefulness. The
antiquity of its origin has not attenuated its vitality.
There should be nothing shocking in the realization that new remedies and
methods are constantly being provided to relieve from the unforseen difficulties
of an oppressive vacuum; i.e., the otherwise total absence of a remedy in some
particular situation. Aspersions of illegitimacy should not be cast upon coram nobis
in this state because it had its birth in the judiciary It is notorious that the legis-
' Cases cited note 24, supra.
'0 Anderson v. Buchanan supra note 37.
'
t Id. at 819, 168 S.W 2d 53.
"
t Note, 37 HAnv. L. REv. 744 (1923-24).
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lature looks with disfavor upon any suggested change in the criminal procedure.4 3
So long as the concept can be traced to the legitimate parentage of public morals,
opinions, and ideals which collectively is the womb for the embryomc formulation
of our sense of right and justice, our principles are being preserved. In short, this
is the nductive process of how the question of "what is due process of law" in a
given situation is determined. As tis elastic test of subjectivity extends, the need
for corresponding remedies becomes manifest. Coram nobts is the answer.
JOHN W SUBLETrr
DO KENTUCKY CITIES HAVE ANY INHERENT RIGHTS AS TO LOCAL
FUNCTIONS FREE FROM LEGISLATIVE CONTROL?
Under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution all powers
not delegated to the United States are reserved to the States and to the people.
This came about because of the nature of the Federal government wich was
created by a compact between sovereign states. Such a relationship does not exist
between a city and a state. In fact the reverse is true, since cities have ordinarily
been created by the state in the first instance and derive all their governmental
powers from the state. Therefore, it would seem that a state legislature, except
as limited by express provisions in the state constitution, would have plenary
power in respect to cities within the boundaries of the state as to governmental
functions. This is the view generally accepted and is often extended to include
even local functions. However, in a few jurisdictions it is recognized that a city
has certain inherent rights in regard to local functions without the aid of any
express state constitutional provision. This doctrine originated in People v Hurl-
but,' an early Michigan case, where judge Cooley conceived and advanced the
theory that a city has certain inherent rights, irrespective of constitutional pro-
visions, %vluch ciannot be abrogated by the legislature. An attempt will be made
to ascertain the position of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in relation to this
doctrine.
In order to determine whether a Kentucky city has any inherent rights free
from legislative control, such as those afforded to an individual, it is of prime
importance to consider the Court's view of the nature and source of the city s right
to exist. The status of the city in relation to the legislature is described in an
early Kentucky case as follows:
"Cities and towns are mere creatures of the legislature,
and the power exists in that department of the state government not
only to abolish the courts but to destroy the existence of the corpora-
tion by a repeal of its charter."2
From this statement it is apparent that the legislature is deemed to be the creator
and the city a mere creature or agent; therefore, the only conclusion is that the
city has no right to exist except vith the consent of the legislature.
' Orfield, CmuNAir PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL (1947). Comment.
50 YALE L. J. 107 (1940).
124 Mich. 44, 93 (1871)" For conflicting positions as to the soundness of the
doctrine see McQuillin, Constitutional Right of Local Self Government of Munici-
palities, 35 Am. L. REv. 510 (1901) and McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent
Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COL. L. REv. 190, 299 (1916).
"Boyd v. Chambers, 78 Ky. 140, 143 (1879).
